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Abstract 
I propose a straightforward reconciliation of Leibniz’s conception of 
bodies as aggregates of simple substances (i.e., monads) with his doctrine 
that bodies are the phenomena of perceivers, without in the process 
saddling him with any equivocations. The reconciliation relies on the 
familiar idea that in Leibniz’s idiolect, an aggregate of Fs is that which 
immediately presupposes those Fs, or in other words, has those Fs as 
immediate requisites. But I take this idea in a new direction. I argue that a 
phenomenon having its being in one perceiving substance (monad) can 
plausibly be understood to presuppose other perceiving substances 
(monads) in the requisite sense. Accordingly, a phenomenon in one 
monad can indeed be an aggregate of other monads, in Leibniz’s technical 
sense, just as the latter monads can be constituents of the phenomenon. So 
understood, the two conceptions of body are perfectly compatible, just as 
Leibniz seems to think. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Leibniz notoriously advances what appear to be conflicting accounts of the 
nature of material bodies. On the one hand, he characterizes them as 
aggregates, assemblages, collections, or multitudes of substances. In some 
of these cases the substances he has in mind may well be of the corporeal 
variety, that is, the composites of substantial form and (secondary) matter 
of which he believes every body, whether animate or inanimate, is 
composed ad infinitum. But in many of these texts his point is clearly that 
bodies are, at least in the final analysis, aggregates of simple substances or 
monads.1 He therefore affirms what has come to be known as the aggregate 
                                                 
1. See, for example, GP IV, 491-92/AG 146-47; GP VII, 564; GP III, 367; GP III, 
622; GP VI, 598/AG 207; GP VI, 607/AG 213; GP II, 504/L 614. Leibniz also 
expresses this claim by saying that a body is not a substance but substances, as is 
clear from what he says at A VI, 4, 1670/AG 105; cf. A II, 2, 639; GP II, 262. For 
further discussion, see Robert M. Adams, Leibniz: Determinist, Theist, Idealist 
[Leibniz] (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994) 241-44. Note that though in 
this paper I speak of bodies as aggregates of simple substances, the reconciliation 
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thesis, or as I will call it, Aggregation: 
 
(Aggregation) A body is an aggregate (assemblage, collection, 
multitude) of simple substances (monads). 
 
In still other texts, Leibniz expresses the same basic view by saying that 
simple substances are in bodies or matter, or equivalently, that such 
substances are constituents, ingredients, or elements of bodies.2 So he also 
endorses Inclusion: 
 
(Inclusion) Simple substances (monads) are in bodies as 
constituents, ingredients, or elements. 
 
On the other hand, Leibniz also frequently affirms what I will call 
Phenomenalism3: 
 
(Phenomenalism) A body is a phenomenon or appearance, that is, 
a being of perception or of the imagination. 
 
The problem, as commentators have long recognized, is that 
Phenomenalism appears to conflict with both Aggregation and Inclusion. 
Leibniz often speaks of phenomena in terms which imply that they are 
something like perceptual contents or (merely) intentional objects, that is, 
                                                                                                                                     
I am proposing works equally well on the assumption that bodies are ultimately 
aggregates of corporeal or composite substances. 
2. For the claim that simple substances are in bodies or matter, see, for 
example, A VI, 4, 1673; GP IV, 492/AG 147; GP IV, 512/AG 163; GP II, 301. For the 
claim that simple substances are constituents, ingredients, or elements of bodies, 
see, for example, GP II, 267-68/DeV 301; GP VII, 502; GP II, 483-84/DesB 323; GP 
VI, 607, 608/AG 214; GP II, 517-19/AG 203-5. 
3. Some commentators have wanted to reserve the term ‘phenomenalism’ 
for the view that bodies are mere appearances, appearances that neither 
correspond to nor are grounded in any external reality (see, e.g., Donald 
Rutherford, “Phenomenalism and the Reality of Body in Leibniz’s Later 
Philosophy” [“Phenomenalism”] Studia Leibnitiana 22:1 (1990) 11-28; Donald 
Rutherford, “Metaphysics: The Late Period” [“Metaphysics”] in The Cambridge 
Companion to Leibniz, ed. Nicholas Jolley (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
1995) 143-47). As I am characterizing it, however, Phenomenalism remains 
neutral concerning whether the appearances with which bodies are identified 
correspond to or are grounded in anything outside the perceiver. 
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things which have their being only within the perceiving subject. 4 
Throughout the period of his mature metaphysics (ca. 1686-1716), he often 
describes phenomena as internal to the soul or perceiver, and even more 
frequently likens them to well-ordered dreams.5 In still other texts he 
construes them as beings of perception or of the imagination, which he 
likens to beings of reason (A II, 2, 184-86/AG 85-86; GP VI, 586/AG 263). 
This is telling because in the schools, an ens rationis had typically been 
understood, as in Suárez, as “that which has being only objectively in the 
intellect.”6 Leibniz’s point would appear to be that phenomena have their 
being only within the faculties of perception and imagination of mind-like, 
perceiving substances, that is, monads. But if a body is a phenomenon in 
this sense, then it is hard to see how it could also be an aggregate of 
monads. For how could that which has its being only within the mind be in 
any real sense an aggregate of beings existing outside the mind? Likewise, 
it is hard to see how that which exists outside the mind, that is, other 
monads, could be in any real sense ingredients or constituents of a 
perceptual content subsisting only in the mind. 7 On the most natural 
                                                 
4. Cf. Adams, Leibniz, 219. In describing phenomena as perceptual contents, I 
do not mean to suggest that they are perceptions or perceptual states. Nor do I 
mean to rule out the possibility that they can be divided into smaller perceptual 
contents. Indeed they can be divided, just as a phenomenon such as the centaur in 
my dream can be divided into parts (the human part, the horse part), which can in 
turn be divided into still smaller parts, and so forth. Cf. Pauline Phemister, Leibniz 
and the Natural World: Activity, Passivity and Corporeal Substance in Leibniz’s 
Philosophy [Natural World] (Dordrecht: Springer, 2005) 168. 
5. On phenomena as internal, see GP VII, 296/L 232; A VI, 4, 1549-51/AG 46-47; 
A II, 2, 91/WFN 53; GP VII, 319/L 363; GP IV, 484/WFN 18; GP IV, 476-77/WFN 27; 
GP VI, 404/H 409-10; GP VI, 589-90/AG 265. On phenomena as like well-ordered 
dreams, see A VI, 4, 1622/Ar 315; A II, 2, 186/AG 86; A II, 2, 201-2/WFN 55; GP IV, 
473/WFN 23; GP IV, 484/WFN 18; GP IV, 476-77/WFN 27; GP IV, 519/WFN 81; GP 
IV, 569/WFN 123; GP VI, 494/AG 188; NE 374-75; GP VII, 467-68; GP VI, 404/H 
409-10; GP VI, 589-90/AG 265; GP III, 567n; GP III, 623; GP II, 435-36/DesB 227; GP 
II, 504/DesB 351. 
6. Disputationes metaphysicae, disp. 54, sec. 1, no. 6, in John Doyle, Francisco 
Suárez, S. J.: On Beings of Reason, Metaphysical Disputation LIV (Milwaukee: 
Marquette University Press, 1994) 62. On Leibniz’s familiarity with Suárez and his 
Disputationes, see Roger Ariew, “Descartes and Leibniz as Readers of Suárez: 
Theory of Distinctions and Principle of Individuation,” in The Philosophy of 
Francisco Suárez, ed. Benjamin Hill and Henrik Lagerlund (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2012) 46-54. 
7. Glenn A. Hartz, Leibniz’s Final System: Monads, Matter, and Animals [Final 
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interpretation of Phenomenalism, then, that doctrine seems flatly 
incompatible with Aggregation and Inclusion. 
Reactions to this apparent tension have run the gamut. Some 
commentators, such as Robert Adams and Donald Rutherford, have 
argued that on a proper understanding of these doctrines, they are in fact 
compatible.8 I will refer to this general outlook as compatibilism.9 But many 
Leibniz scholars have been unmoved by these arguments. They have 
instead tended to favor one form or another of incompatibilism, that is, the 
view that Phenomenalism does indeed conflict with Aggregation and 
Inclusion. Perhaps the most straightforward version of this sort of 
approach involves supposing that Leibniz treats these doctrines as 
compatible because he simply fails to see any inconsistency in them. But 
could he really have failed to perceive such a conspicuous tension in views 
he developed and defended many times over many years? The possibility 
seems rather remote. 
In the early days of this debate, some incompatibilists attempted to 
blunt the perceived tension by downplaying or denying Leibniz’s 
commitment to one or the other of these doctrines. According to some, 
Leibniz embraced Aggregation but only “toyed” or “flirted” with 
Phenomenalism.10 According to another, he went through a period of 
uncertainty and vacillation until around 1704, when he settled on 
Phenomenalism as his considered view.11 These interpretations failed to 
                                                                                                                                     
System] (Abingdon: Routledge, 2007) 144; Richard T. W. Arthur, “Presupposition, 
Aggregation, and Leibniz’s Argument for a Plurality of Substances” 
[“Presupposition”] Leibniz Review 21 (2011) 95. 
8 . See Adams, Leibniz, 217-61; Rutherford, “Phenomenalism,” 18-19; 
Rutherford, “Aggregation,” 69; Rutherford, “Metaphysics,” 147-48; Donald 
Rutherford, “Leibniz as Idealist” [“Idealist”] Oxford Studies in Early Modern 
Philosophy 4 (2008) 181; Paul Hoffman, “The Being of Leibnizian Phenomena” 
[“Being”] Studia Leibnitiana 28:1 (1996) 118; Paul Lodge, “Leibniz’s Notion of an 
Aggregate” [“Aggregate”] British Journal for the History of Philosophy 9:3 (2001) 
467-86; Lodge, DeV lxxxiv-v. 
9. Cf. Hartz, Final System, 13-14. 
10. See G. H. R. Parkinson, Logic and Reality in Leibniz’s Metaphysics (Oxford: 
The Clarendon Press, 1965) 166-67, 190-91; Nicholas Jolley, “Leibniz and 
Phenomenalism,” Studia Leibnitiana 18:1 (1986) 38-46. 
11. See Louis Loeb, From Descartes to Hume: Continental Metaphysics and the 
Development of Modern Philosophy (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1981) 
293-305; cf. Montgomery Furth, “Monadology,” The Philosophical Review 76:2 
(1967) 184-89. 
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gain much traction, however, as commentators increasingly appreciated 
that Leibniz endorses all three doctrines in writings from the same period, 
including the last years of his life, and sometimes even in the very same 
writings. In recognition of this, other incompatibilists have taken up the 
challenge of explaining why Leibniz would more or less simultaneously 
affirm doctrines he recognized as incompatible. Thus, to mention just two 
recent examples, Glenn Hartz speculates that Leibniz intentionally kept 
both theories in play, exploring, defending, and critizing them without 
ever picking a winner, 12  while Daniel Garber maintains that Leibniz 
struggled to decide between the two competing conceptions of body and 
never arrived at a settled view of the matter.13 
In what follows I will argue that there is no need to resort to such 
incompatibilist hypotheses, because Aggregation and Inclusion can 
plausibly be reconciled with Phenomenalism. In Section 2, I set the stage by 
considering and raising doubts about the strategy of revising the usual 
understanding of Phenomenalism in order to bring it into harmony with 
Aggregation and Inclusion. I then devote the remainder of the essay to 
developing and defending a version of the opposite strategy, namely, one 
which revises the usual understanding of Aggregation and Inclusion in 
order to bring them into line with Phenomenalism. In Section 3, I argue 
that when Leibniz affirms Aggregation and Inclusion, he can plausibly be 
taken to be presupposing the technical conceptions of aggregate, constituent, 
and ingredient that he articulates in various collections of definitions 
                                                 
12. See Hartz, Final System. Hartz frames his discussion in terms of the “realist 
theory”, of which Aggregation and Inclusion are components, and the “idealist 
theory”, of which Phenomenalism is a part (pp. 27-29). 
13. See Daniel Garber, Leibniz: Body, Substance, Monad [Body, Substance, Monad] 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2009) 267-388. Garber identifies two strands 
in Leibniz’s thinking about the relation between monads and bodies: the view 
that bodies are aggregates of monads (p. 356) and the view that they are “the 
contents of the perceptions of individual monads” (p. 363). Some of his remarks 
suggest that he understands the latter view to include the idea that these 
perceptual contents have no foundation in any external reality. For example, he 
says that on this view bodies are “the common dream of an infinity of monads” 
(p. 364). Yet there is no reason why the contents of our perceptions of monads 
could not have a foundation in some external reality, and indeed in describing 
this view Garber speaks of monads “grounding” the existence of bodies through 
their perceptions of them (ibid.). The thought appears to be that what I am calling 
Aggregation and Phenomenalism are conflicting conceptions of body (cf. p. 296, 
n. 7). 
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assembled in the late 1670s and 1680s. According to these definitions, to be 
a constituent or ingredient of a thing is just be one of its immediate requisites, 
and an aggregate of Fs is simply a being that has those Fs as constituents, 
i.e., immediate requisites. Finally, in Section 4, I argue that the monads 
which serve as the real foundation of a well-founded phenomenon can 
plausibly be understood as its immediate requisites, even if the 
phenomenon has its being in another monad. From this it follows that a 
phenomenon having its being solely in the mind can be, in Leibniz’s 
technical sense, an “aggregate” of things outside the mind, just as things 
outside the mind can be “constituents” or “ingredients” of things inside 
the mind. Properly understood, then, Aggregation and Inclusion do in fact 
cohere with Phenomenalism, and at least with respect to this issue, 
compatibilism should be preferred to any of the various incompatibilist 
approaches on offer.14 
 
2. Leibnizian Phenomena 
Despite their apparent incompatibility, Leibniz writes as if he considers 
these doctrines perfectly compatible. As I noted above, he affirms all three 
in writings from the same period and even in the same writings. Even 
more significantly, there are many texts in which he speaks as if he thinks 
being an aggregate goes hand-in-hand with being a phenomenon. In a 
letter to the Electress Sophie dated 31 October 1705, for example, he writes 
that a mass of matter is only “an aggregate, a collection [amas], a multitude 
of an infinity of true substances, a well-founded phenomenon” (GP VII, 
564).15 Similarly, in the Entretien de Philarète et Ariste, he remarks: 
                                                 
14. The question of compatibility also arises in connection with Leibniz’s 
apparent acceptance of corporeal substances and his belief that the only true 
substances are simple. For a recent attempt at a compatibilist account of Leibniz’s 
claims about substance, see Jeffrey K. McDonough, “Leibniz’s Conciliatory 
Account of Substance,” Philosophers’ Imprint 13:6 (2013) 1-23. 
15. The parenthetical “setting the understanding aside” which qualifies this 
remark has been taken by some to imply that the aggregate of simple substances 
mentioned here exists independently of perception (see Hidé Ishiguro, “Unity 
Without Simplicity: Leibniz on Organisms,” The Monist 81:4 (1998) 549; Lodge, 
“Aggregate,” 484; cf. Rutherford, “Idealist,” 179n60). But this conflicts with 
Leibniz’s claim that this aggregate is also a phenomenon, something which is not 
independent of perception. In my view, Leibniz uses the word ‘understanding’ 
here rather than a broader term such as ‘perception’ or ‘mind’ because the point 
of the parenthetical is not to set aside perception or mental activity in general, but 
to set aside ideal things, particularly mathematical bodies, which, as he points out 
LEIBNIZIAN BODIES 
7 
 
[B]ody is not a true unity; it is only an aggregate, what the 
schools call one by accident, an assemblage like a flock; its 
unity arises from our perception. It is a being of reason, or 
rather of imagination, a phenomenon. (GP VI, 586/AG 263).16 
Texts such as these suggest that on Leibniz’s view, something can be at 
once both an aggregate of substances and a phenomenon. 
On a number of occasions, Leibniz even claims that being an aggregate 
entails being a phenomenon.17 In a 1715 letter to Nicolas Remond, for 
instance, he reasons as follows: 
[S]econdary matter (e.g., the organic body) is not a substance, 
but a collection [amas] of several substances, like a pond full 
of fish or a flock of sheep. Consequently it is what we call 
unum per accidens, and in a word, a phenomenon. (GP III, 657; 
cf. GP II, 252/DeV 265; GP VII, 344/AG 319) 
The argument here is rather compressed, but elsewhere Leibniz supplies 
the missing premises. A collection or aggregate of substances, he tells us, is 
an unum per accidens rather than an unum per se. As such, it has unity only 
insofar as the substances are perceived as one, or in other words, only 
insofar as they appear to some perceiver as a unity (GP II, 517/AG 203; cf. 
GP VI, 586/AG 263). The unity of an aggregate is therefore phenomenal or 
apparent, and since on Leibniz’s view being and unity are convertible, it 
follows that the being of an aggregate must also be phenomenal: 
This unity of the idea of an aggregate is a very genuine one; 
but at bottom it must be admitted that this unity of 
collections [collections] is only a respect or relation the 
foundation of which is in that which we find in each of the 
individual substances taken alone. Thus these Beings by 
Aggregation have only a mental unity, and consequently their 
being is also in a way mental, or phenomenal, like that of a 
rainbow. (NE 146; cf. A II, 2, 186/AG 86; GP II, 300/DesB 21; 
                                                                                                                                     
earlier in the letter, reside in the understanding and are “not at all composed of 
points” (GP VII, 561). In effect, the sense of his remark is that if we set aside ideal 
things, including mathematical bodies, what remains, actual bodies, are 
composed of indivisible constituents. 
16. See also GP III, 69/WFN 129-30; GP II, 261-62/DeV 285-87. Leibniz does not 
explicitly indicate here what body is an aggregate of, but given his frequently 
expressed belief that composites must ultimately be aggregates of simples, the 
clear implication is that body is an aggregate of monads. 
17. Cf. Adams, Leibniz, 245-47. 
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GP II, 304/DesB 31)18 
From the fact that something is an aggregate, then, it follows that it must 
also be a phenomenon, even if it is an aggregate of substances. But how is 
this possible? 
In defending his version of compatibilism, Adams attempts to render 
Leibniz’s position more palatable by offering reasons for thinking that an 
aggregate need not have the same ontological status as its constituents. For 
instance, he likens aggregates to sets, which need not have the same 
ontological status as their members.19 Further, he notes that an aggregate 
of substances, as “a sort of logical or metaphysical construction out of 
substances”, need not have the same ontological status as those 
substances.20 In my opinion, however, he fails to make his case. For the 
observation that an aggregate need not have the same ontological status as 
its constituents does little to explain how something as different from 
simple substances as a perceptual content could be nothing but an 
aggregate of such substances.21 More importantly, it seems to me that any 
satisfactory case for the compatibility of Leibniz’s claims about body must 
suggest a way in which our understanding of either Phenomenalism, on 
the one hand, or Aggregation and Inclusion, on the other, can plausibly be 
revised so as to bring them into harmony with the other(s). Since Adams 
makes no attempt to offer any such revised understanding, his case 
remains at best incomplete. 
One compatibilist who has proposed such a revision is Rutherford. He 
grants that Leibniz sometimes conceives of phenomena in the “narrower 
and more usual” sense of an appearance or object of perception,22 or the 
content of a mental representation, something which has its being only in 
the mind and which “by itself makes no claim on an extramental 
existence.”23 However, he maintains that Leibniz frequently uses the term 
‘phenomenon’ more broadly to refer to any aggregate or being by 
aggregation. In this sense of the term, a phenomenon is anything that 
                                                 
18. In his letter to Arnauld from 30 April 1687, Leibniz claims both that beings 
by aggregation “have their unity only in our mind” and that “one and being are 
reciprocal” (A II, 2, 186/AG 86). The clear implication is that aggregates also have 
their being only in the mind, thus are phenomena. 
19. Adams, Leibniz, 244-45. 
20. Adams, Leibniz, 245. 
21. For other, related criticisms of this aspect of Adams’ view, see Hoffman, 
“Being”; Hartz, Final System, 143-46, 149-51. 
22. Rutherford, “Aggregation,” 69-70. 
23. Rutherford, “Idealist,” 147, 181. 
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depends on perception for its existence.24 As such, it refers not only to 
those purely mental beings that are phenomena in the narrow sense, but 
also to aggregates of monads, which are not purely mental but 
“semi-mental” beings. These aggregates are not purely mental, says 
Rutherford, because they are constituted from monads in a way that no 
mental content could be. But they nonetheless depend on perception for 
their existence, since they do not exist unless some perceiver apprehends 
their constituents as one. Accordingly, so long as we understand 
Phenomenalism as the claim that a body is a phenomenon in this broader 
sense, that doctrine harmonizes perfectly with Aggregation and Inclusion. 
One problem with this recasting of Phenomenalism is that it does not fit 
particularly well with Leibniz’s characterizations of phenomena. Although 
a few scattered texts can be found in which he speaks of phenomena as 
external, the bulk of the evidence, as I noted above, points to the narrow, 
more usual sense of the term.25 For this reason it seems to me that we 
would do better, if possible, to reconcile his claims about body without 
giving this seemingly ancillary use of ‘phenomenon’ such a prominent role 
in his thought. Moreover, there are some texts in which Leibniz affirms 
both Aggregation and Phenomenalism while clearly having the narrow 
conception of phenomenon in mind. For instance, in the aforementioned 
remark from the Entretien de Philarète et Ariste, Leibniz asserts in the same 
breath both that body is an aggregate—presumably of substances—and a 
phenomenon, which he equates with a being of the imagination. Slightly 
later in the same discussion he characterizes phenomena as “internal” and 
“in the soul”, as “modifications of our souls”, and as differing from dreams 
only by dint of their interconnections (GP VI, 589-91/AG 265-66). Surely the 
most natural interpretation of this remark is that a body is both an 
aggregate of monads and something having its being only within the soul. 
Another such text appears in an addendum to Leibniz’s July 1714 letter to 
Remond. Within a single paragraph he claims that bodies are assemblages 
                                                 
24. See Rutherford, “Phenomenalism,” 18-19; Rutherford, “Aggregation,” 
69-70; Rutherford, “Idealist,” 181. For similar proposals see Phemister, Natural 
World, 165-69; Garber, Body, Substance, Monad, 292-96; Lodge, DeV lxxxiii-lxxxiv. 
25. For descriptions of phenomena as external, see GP III, 465; GP VI, 599/AG 
208. Leibniz does draw a distinction in the New Essays between internal and 
external appearances, but by the latter he means “those consisting in what 
appears to others” (NE 237). Such appearances need not be external to perceivers 
in general. For evidence of the narrow conception of phenomena, see §1 above 
and especially note 5. 
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of monads; that they are well-founded phenomena or appearances; that 
these phenomena are “different in different observers” and “like exact and 
enduring dreams”; and that material objects are “nothing outside of 
perceptions” (GP III, 622-23). Once again, the clear implication is that these 
aggregates of monads are phenomena in the narrow sense of a kind of 
mental being. Of course, we could suppose that Leibniz vacillates in his 
understanding of phenomena even within these passages, but if possible, I 
would prefer to avoid saddling him with that unflattering charge. 
Besides these textual considerations, there is another reason for 
doubting whether Leibniz ever conceived of phenomena as having any 
claim to an extramental being or existence. It is supposed to be of the 
essence of a phenomenon that it depends on perception for its being. By 
perceiving or imagining many substances as one, we bring it about that the 
phenomenon has being. We give it unity, and thus give it being. But if that 
being is extramental, even in part, then it follows that we have the power 
to create new beings outside of us just by way of our mental activity—a 
power of a sort that seems utterly foreign to Leibniz's thought. In contrast, 
there is nothing untoward in the idea that through our mental activity we 
create new perceptual contents. Hence, if a phenomenon is something 
which depends on perception for its being, it seems to follow that its being 
must be within the mind, not outside it; it must be a phenomenon in the 
“narrower and more usual” sense. 
Having expressed my doubts about the prospects of revising 
Phenomenalism in order to bring it into line with Aggregation and 
Inclusion, I now want to lobby for a version of the opposite approach. I will 
argue that Aggregation and Inclusion can plausibly be construed so as to 
bring them into harmony with Phenomenalism, as that doctrine is most 
naturally understood. Ironically, I will rely on some important insights 
from other aspects of Rutherford’s interpretation of Leibniz, though not 
ones he appropriates in addressing this problem. 
 
3. Leibnizian Aggregates 
During the late 1670s and the 1680s, just as his mature metaphysics was 
taking shape, Leibniz was hard at work developing definitions of various 
basic concepts in support of his plan for a scientia generalis or universal 
method for science. 26 As it happens, we find among these definitions 
technical characterizations of ‘aggregate’ and of the related inclusion terms 
                                                 
26. On the idea of a scientia generalis, see Louis Couturat, La Logique de Leibniz 
d’après des Documents Inédits (Paris: F. Alcan, 1901) chs. 5-6. 
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that differ from the ordinary, mereological understanding of these terms.27 
My contention in what follows will be that these technical definitions are 
precisely the ones Leibniz presupposes when he affirms Aggregation and 
Inclusion, and that once this is recognized, we can see that these doctrines 
straightforwardly cohere with Phenomenalism. The first of these 
contentions is not particularly new. In fact, the idea that Leibniz 
presupposes these technical conceptions in his mature metaphysical 
writings goes back at least to Rutherford’s work in the early 1990s.28 More 
recently, the idea has been taken up by Stefano Di Bella, Massimo Mugnai, 
Richard Arthur, and again by Rutherford, though none of them apply the 
idea to our problem in the way I will be doing.29 As these writers have 
already analyzed the relevant texts in considerable detail, I will forego a 
close exposition of that material and instead sketch the general contours of 
the relevant conceptual terrain. To begin, it will be necessary to consider 
some background concepts from Leibniz’s theory of conditions. 
Leibniz defines a condition (conditio) as something that must be posited 
in order for another thing, the conditionatum, to be posited (A VI, 4, 389; A 
VI, 4, 401; A VI, 4, 563; A VI, 4, 641; A VI, 4, 871; A VI, 4, 932). In essence, 
one thing is a condition of another just in case the latter is ontologically 
dependent on the former. He then defines a requisite (requisitum) as a 
condition that is prior in nature to the corresponding conditionatum (A VI, 
4, 308; A VI, 4, 402; A VI, 4, 563; A VI, 4, 627; A VI, 4, 871). The notion of 
priority in nature is one Leibniz characterizes in a number of ways. In 
some texts, he describes this kind of priority as a matter of being more 
easily understood (A VI, 4, 180; A VI, 4, 389; A VI, 4, 563) or more easily 
shown to be possible (A VI, 4, 180; A VI, 4, 1427). In others, he claims that 
thing A is prior in nature to thing B just in case A has a simpler concept 
(notio) than B (A VI, 4, 389; A VI, 4, 872), enters into the concept (conceptum) 
of B (A VI, 4, 937), or involves the reason for B (A VI, 4, 563; A VI, 4, 940). 
Without going into the details of how these characterizations are related or 
whether they are equivalent or even compatible, I will proceed under the 
                                                 
27. Cf. Hartz, Final System, 105. 
28. See, especially, Donald Rutherford, “Leibniz’s ‘Analysis of Multitude and 
Phenomena into Unities and Reality’,” Journal of the History of Philosophy 28:4 
(1990) 525-52. 
29. See Stefano Di Bella, “Leibniz’s Theory of Conditions: A Framework for 
Ontological Dependence,” Leibniz Review 15 (2005) 67-93; Massimo Mugnai, 
“Leibniz and ‘Bradley’s Regress’,” Leibniz Review 20 (2010) 1-12; Arthur, 
“Presupposition,” 91-115; Rutherford, “Idealist”. 
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assumption that the central idea has to do with conceptual priority. So I 
will assume that one thing is prior in nature to another just in case its 
concept is included in or presupposed by the concept of the other. 30 
Accordingly, A will be a requisite of B just in case (i) A is conceptually prior 
to B and (ii) B cannot be posited without thereby positing A. 
Within the category of requisites, Leibniz distinguishes the mediate 
from the immediate. Mediate requisites, he tells us, are those which “must 
be investigated by reasoning, such as causes” (A VI, 4, 627/Ar 271). 
Immediate requisites, in contrast, must be “independent of any change or 
action and passion” (A VI, 4, 650). The distinction is not entirely clear, but 
his thought appears to be that the dependence of a thing on its mediate 
requisites is physical or metaphysical, whereas the dependence of a thing 
on its immediate requisites, if it has them, is conceptual. Thus oxygen 
would be a mediate requisite of fire, God a mediate requisite of the 
universe, and so forth. But, to use Leibniz’s own favorite illustration, the 
endpoints of a finite line would be immediate requisites of the line, since it 
is not just physically or metaphysically but conceptually impossible for 
there to be such a line in the absence of its endpoints (A VI, 4, 1669/AG 103; 
A VI, 4, 1673; GM VII, 19/L 667). From this point of view, to say that one 
thing is an immediate requisite of another is to say that the latter depends 
on the former with conceptual necessity. 
In addition to these presupposition relations, Leibniz defines a 
corresponding system of what may be called entailment relations. If positing 
B presupposes positing A, then he calls B the conditioned (conditonatum) and 
A the condition (conditio). But if positing A entails positing B, then in his 
terminology B is the inferred (illatum) and A the inferential basis (inferens) (A 
VI, 4, 389; A VI, 4, 401; A VI, 4, 563; A VI, 4, 641; A VI, 4, 864; A VI, 4, 869; A 
VI, 4, 871; A VI, 4, 940), or B the determined (determinatum) and A the 
determining (determinans) (6.4:404). If positing B presupposes positing A 
and A is prior in nature to B, Leibniz calls A the requisite (requisitum) and B 
the requiring (requirens). Similarly, if positing A entails positing B and A is 
prior in nature to B, he calls A the predetermining (praedeterminans) and the 
B the predetermined (praedeterminatum) (A VI, 4, 403; A VI, 4, 564).31 Finally, 
                                                 
30 . On the notion of priority in nature, see Christia Mercer, Leibniz’s 
Metaphysics: Its Origin and Development (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2001) 314-19. 
31. Alternatively, Leibniz sometimes refers to an inferens that is prior in nature 
to the corresponding illatum as the cause or producer (producens), and the illatum as 
the effect or product (productum) (A VI, 4, 393; A VI, 4, 565; A VI, 4, 872). 
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though this is not entirely clear, Leibniz appears to distinguish between 
predetermination that is mediate, as when a cause produces a distinct 
effect, and predetermination that is immediate, as when a foundational 
reality gives rise to a less foundational reality which it grounds. The latter 
relation he also calls resulting: “I understand that to result […] which is 
immediately understood to be posited once we have posited those things 
from which it results” (A VI, 4, 310; cf. GM VII, 21-22/L 669). 
With these background concepts in place, we can now introduce 
Leibniz’s technical definitions of ‘aggregate’ and the related inclusion 
terms. Since he has more to say about them, I will start with the latter. Here 
four points are salient. First, in Leibniz’s terminology, to be in [inesse] or 
exist in [inexisto] something is the same as to be an ingredient [ingrediens], 
constituent [constituens], or content [contentum] of that thing. This is 
evident both from the fact that he uses these terms interchangeably and 
from the fact that he defines them the same way. Second, Leibniz 
frequently and typically defines inclusion in terms of presupposition, and 
more specifically in terms of the idea of an immediate requisite (A VI, 4, 
411; A VI, 4, 650; A VI, 4, 941; A VI, 4, 1001-2; GM VII, 19/L 667). In his 
idiolect, to say that A is an ingredient of L is just to say that A is an 
immediate requisite of L. More colloquially, a thing’s ingredients are just 
those things it immediately presupposes. Third, on a few occasions, 
Leibniz offers an alternative definition of inclusion not in terms of 
presupposition, but in terms of entailment, that is, not in terms of being an 
immediate requisite, but, in effect, in terms of being a result or “immediate 
predeterminatum” (A VI, 4, 998; A VI, 4, 1002; cf. A VI, 4, 627/Ar 271). 
According to this alternative definition, to say that A is an ingredient of L is 
just to say that L results either from A itself or from A together with some 
other entities B, C, … (but not from B, C, … alone). Finally, it is important 
to note that Leibniz appears to consider these definitions not only 
compatible but (extensionally) equivalent. This is evident from the fact that 
in two of the texts in which he defines inclusion in terms of resulting, he 
reiterates that the ingredients are immediate requisites of the thing they 
predetermine (A VI, 4, 998; A VI, 4, 1002). An interesting consequence of 
this equivalence is that for Leibniz, A will be an immediate requisite of L 
just in case L results either from A itself or from A together with B, C, … 
(but not from B, C, … alone). So the endpoints of a finite line will be its 
immediate requisites. But by that very fact the line will also result from the 
endpoints, because they cannot be posited as such, that is, as endpoints, 
without thereby positing the line, it being impossible to have termini 
without a thing that terminates. At the same time, it will be true that those 
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things from which another results are its immediate requisites, since a 
thing results from its constituents and we cannot posit a thing without 
thereby positing its constituents, assuming it has them. 
As for the concept of aggregate, the first thing to note is that if 
aggregation is just the inverse of inclusion, then we would expect Leibniz 
to define the notion of an aggregate in keeping with his technical 
definitions of the inclusion terms. This expectation is not disappointed, as 
we can see from this text composed around 1689 or 1690: 
In order to explain what it means to contain [continens] and 
be contained [contentum] or exist in [inexistentia], the concept 
of immediate requisite is not needed, for to have an 
aggregate it suffices that several beings different from it are 
understood to come together in a way similar to it. Thus if A, 
B, C are posited in the same way, and by this very fact L is 
understood to be posited, then A, B, C will be aggregated 
things [aggreganda] and L the whole arising through 
aggregation. At the same time, it is true that they are 
immediate requisites. (A VI, 4, 998; cf. A VI, 4, 627/Ar 271) 
Here Leibniz begins by making the point that inclusion can be defined 
without appealing to the notion of an immediate requisite, but then he 
seamlessly transitions to making the point that an aggregate is just 
something which must be understood to be posited by the very fact that 
two or more other things are posited “in the same way”.32 In effect, he 
appears to be defining an aggregate as a thing which results from two or 
more other things, just as he elsewhere defines the ingredients of a thing as 
those things from which it results. But he adds that even though the 
notions of aggregate and ingredient can be defined in this way, it is also 
true that the constituents of the aggregate will be its immediate requisites. 
The implication appears to be that an aggregate can also be defined as 
some L which has A, B, C as its immediate requisites. 
Many of the texts in which Leibniz propounds these technical 
definitions of aggregation and inclusion date from the 1680s, around the 
time his mature metaphysics was taking shape. Yet in none of them does 
he clearly have that metaphysics in view. One question we must therefore 
consider is what reason we have to believe that he understands the various 
                                                 
32. When Leibniz speaks of A, B, C being “posited in the same way” and 
coming together “in a way similar to” L, he may mean that what we posit of A, B, 
C (e.g., being, existence, reality) must be the same quality that, by that very fact, 
we posit of L, in order for L to be an aggregate of A, B, C. 
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inclusion and aggregation terms in accordance with these definitions 
when, in other contexts, he discusses the relationship of bodies to monads. 
Though the evidence concerning this point is far from abundant, there 
are several texts in which Leibniz clearly alludes to these technical 
definitions in explicating his theory of body. In some of these, he claims 
that monads are not parts but requisites, even immediate requisites, of 
bodies. One relatively late example comes from a 1712 letter to Friedrich 
Wilhelm Bierling, in which Leibniz notes that monads “are not parts of 
bodies, but requisites” (GP VII, 503). Even more explicit are a pair of 
remarks in the Fardella notes, which Leibniz recorded in 1690, around the 
same time he composed some of the texts in which he articulates the 
technical definitions of aggregation and inclusion. In the first of these, 
Leibniz cautions that 
we must not infer that the indivisible substance enters into 
the composition of body as a part, but rather as an essential, 
internal requisite, just as we grant that a point is not a part 
that makes up a line, but rather something heterogeneous, 
which is nonetheless necessarily required for the line to be 
and to be understood. (A VI, 4, 1669/AG 103) 
By a requisite that is “essential” and “internal”, we can plausibly assume 
that Leibniz means an immediate requisite, as opposed to a mediate one, 
such as a cause, which would be external and inessential. So the point 
would be that substances are not parts but immediate requisites of bodies. 
In the second of the Fardella passages, Leibniz is even more explicit about 
this: 
There are infinite simple substances or created things in any 
particle of matter; and matter is composed [componitur] from 
these, not as from parts, but as from constitutive principles or 
immediate requisites, just as points enter into the essence of a 
continuum and yet not as parts; for nothing is a part unless it 
is homogeneous with a whole, but substance is not 
homogeneous with matter or body any more than a point is 
with a line. (A VI, 4, 1673; cf. GP VII, 503; GP II, 252/DeV 265; 
GP II, 435/DesB 227; GP II, 451/DesB 255) 
Once again, monads are said to relate to bodies not as parts but as 
immediate requisites. A body is therefore not an aggregate of monads in 
the sense of a mereological whole of monads, but in the technical sense of a 
being which has monads as its (ultimate) immediate requisites. In all these 
passages, Leibniz is clearly alluding to his technical conception of 
aggregate. 
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Another significant text appears in Leibniz’s correspondence with De 
Volder, in a letter dated 30 June 1704. Once again he warns that his talk of 
bodies being composed of monads must be understood with care:  
Accurately speaking, however, matter is not composed of 
constitutive unities, but results from them, since matter or 
extended mass is only a phenomenon grounded [fundatum] 
in things, like a rainbow or parhelion, and all reality belongs 
only to unities. Phenomena can therefore always be divided 
into smaller phenomena which could appear to other more 
subtle animals, and a smallest phenomenon will never be 
reached. Substantial unities are not parts but the foundations 
[fundamenta] of phenomena. (GP II, 268/DeV 303; cf. GP II, 
436/DesB 227)33 
The parts of phenomena, Leibniz tells us here, are always smaller 
phenomena, not substantial unities. Unlike before, however, there is no 
mention here of the idea that monads are immediate requisites of bodies. 
Instead, he contrasts the idea that bodies are composed of monads as of 
parts with the idea that bodies result from monads, which he connects in 
turn with the thought that bodies, as phenomena, are grounded in or 
founded upon simple substances. As we are now in a position to see, 
however, the fundamental point is the same. In Leibniz’s idiolect, the claim 
that L results from A, B, and C is equivalent to the claim that A, B, and C are 
immediate requisites of L, which is in turn equivalent to the claim that L is 
an aggregate of A, B, and C. Hence, to say that a body is not composed of 
monads as of parts, but rather results from monads, is once again to 
suggest that a body is an aggregate of monads not in the ordinary sense of 
a mereological whole of monads, but in the technical sense of a being 
                                                 
33. An anonymous referee points out that this talk of phenomena being 
divided into smaller phenomena, which may appear to other, more subtle 
animals, casts doubt on the view that phenomena have their being only in the 
soul; for a phenomenon having its being in one soul cannot appear to another 
soul. I reply that even though strictly speaking a phenomenon has its being in a 
particular substance, we may suppose that Leibniz sometimes thinks of the 
phenomenon in one soul as in a sense identical to the corresponding phenomena 
in other souls. Thus, the expression “the phenomenon of the moon” might refer 
not just to the moon-appearance in my mind, but collectively to all the 
moon-appearances in various substances. From this point of view, a phenomenon 
may be said to appear to other substances, even though it has its being only 
within the soul (or souls), and even if, strictly speaking, each phenomenon has its 
being only within a particular soul. 
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which has monads as its immediate requisites. The same can be said of 
other passages in which he speaks of bodies or matter as resulting from 
monads.34 
In addition to these texts, I want to offer one other reason for thinking 
that Leibniz has these definitions in view when he affirms Aggregation 
and Inclusion. The reason, which I will develop in the next section, is 
simply that if we assume he was presupposing these definitions, we can 
make good sense of an aspect of his view that is otherwise quite puzzling: 
namely, his belief that an aggregate of monads is also a phenomenon 
having its being in the perceiving subject. 
 
4. Monads as Immediate Requisites 
So far I have argued that in Leibniz’s terminology, Aggregation and 
Inclusion amount to nothing more than the claim that a body is a being 
which has simple substances as its (ultimate) immediate requisites, or 
equivalently, which results from such substances. That is the sense in 
which monads are in matter and bodies are aggregates of monads. To say 
this much, however, is not yet to solve our problem, but only to reframe it. 
The problem now becomes that of explaining how a phenomenon having 
its being in one monad could have other monads as its immediate 
requisites. Recall that in Leibniz’s terminology, A is an immediate requisite 
of B just in case (i) A is prior in nature to B and (ii) the positing of B 
immediately presupposes the positing of A. As for (i), it can plausibly be 
argued that on Leibniz’s view, a phenomenon’s foundational monads are 
naturally prior to it in the sense that they constitute God’s reason for 
creating that phenomenon rather than another (T 66; Monadology, 
§§49-52).35 (ii), however, is a different story. In what sense, we might ask, 
does positing a phenomenon immediately presuppose the positing of 
those monads which serve as its real foundation, that is, its foundational 
monads? As I noted in Section 1 above, Leibniz characterizes phenomena as 
internal to the soul, as like well-ordered dreams, and as beings of 
perception or of the imagination. As such, they would appear to have their 
being in the perceiving subject. But if so, then it cannot be the being of a 
phenomenon which immediately presupposes its foundational monads. 
For the phenomenon would continue to have its being in the perceiving 
                                                 
34. On the notion of resulting, see Rutherford, “Idealist,” 179-84, and the 
citations therein. 
35 . On this aspect of Leibniz’s view, see Stephen Puryear, “Monadic 
Interaction,” British Journal for the History of Philosophy 18:5 (2010). 
LEIBNIZIAN BODIES 
18 
 
subject even if its foundation ceased to exist, though of course it would 
then be an imaginary rather than a real phenomenon. The difficulty 
therefore remains of explaining how a phenomenon’s foundational 
monads can plausibly be understood as its immediate requisites. Unless 
and until this can be explained, we have not yet vindicated the idea that a 
body could be both a phenomenon and an aggregate of monads. 
In this section, I will attempt just such an explanation. In particular, I 
want to suggest that there are at least two important respects in which a 
phenomenon immediately presupposes its foundational monads, and thus 
two respects in which those monads can be considered immediate 
requisites of the phenomenon, even though the phenomenon does not 
depend on those monads for its being. Hence, I will be arguing for the 
striking thesis that a phenomenon having its being in one monad can be 
understood to have other monads as its immediate requisites, and thus, in 
Leibniz’s technical sense, to be an aggregate of those monads. 
To be sure, when Leibniz defines the aggregation and inclusion terms, 
he sometimes characterizes the dependence of a thing on its immediate 
requisites as a dependence of being (see, e.g., A VI, 4, 871). However, he 
sometimes characterizes it as a dependence of existence. For instance, he 
explains that “If A is an immediate requisite of B, A is said to be in B, that 
is, A must not be posterior in nature to B, and having posited the 
nonexistence [non existere] of A, it must follow that B also does not exist 
[non existere]” (A VI, 4, 650). Similarly, he writes: “If, having posited that A 
exists [existere], it follows that B exists [existere] (not necessarily at the same 
time), A will be the inferential basis [inferens], B the inferred [illatum]” (A 
VI, 4, 563). In yet another passage he appears to characterize the 
dependence as a dependence of reality: 
And hence we see that, that is in a subject whose reality is 
part of the reality of the subject itself. Or, to speak in a way 
more apt for forming and demonstrating propositions, A is in 
B, if every thing that is immediately required for A is also 
immediately required for B. But that which is immediately 
required for something, such that nothing more is 
immediately or even mediately required for it, can be called 
reality. (A VI, 4, 990)36 
                                                 
36. Cf. Rutherford, “Idealist,” 173. An anonymous referee notes a potential 
problem for my view in this text. Leibniz defines reality as “that which is 
immediately required for something, such that nothing more is immediately or 
even mediately required for it.” On my view, however, the reality of a body, 
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Hence, while the relation of a thing to its immediate requisites can be 
understood as a dependence of being, Leibniz appears to allow for the 
possibility that the dependence is one of existence or reality. Let us 
consider, then, whether a phenomenon might be thought to depend 
immediately on its foundational monads in one of these other senses. 
Starting with the easier case, it seems clear that a phenomenon’s reality 
does depend immediately on the existence or reality of its foundational 
monads. Though in themselves imaginary, phenomena can be said to 
acquire a kind of reality, Leibniz thinks, in virtue of having a foundation in 
some external, substantial realities. 37  A phenomenon with this sort of 
reality therefore depends on its foundational monads for this reality. 
Having posited the reality of a phenomenon, we must thereby be 
understood to have posited the reality of its foundation. Further, this 
dependence has just the sort of immediacy which Leibniz requires for 
aggregation in his technical sense. The reality of the foundation does not 
cause the reality of the phenomenon; nor is the connection a mere physical 
or metaphysical one. Rather, the existence of the phenomenon 
immediately and necessarily presupposes the existence of its 
foundation—that is, presupposes it with conceptual necessity. For it is 
conceptually impossible for a phenomenon to be real in this sense without 
having a foundation in this substantial reality. This provides us with one 
sense, then, in which a phenomenon’s foundational monads can be 
understood as its immediate requisites, even if the phenomenon does not 
depend on those monads for its being. 
Now for the trickier case of existence. The first thing to note here is that, 
                                                                                                                                     
which is the reality of its foundational monads, is not the only thing the body 
immediately requires; for it evidently also immediately requires the perceiver in 
which it has its being. I do not know whether this passage can be fully reconciled 
with my view, but I would note that it is far from clear that the contents of a 
perceiving substance always immediately require or presuppose that substance in 
the sense Leibniz has in mind here, since otherwise every substance would be in 
each of its own contents—a consequence he would presumably reject. 
37. In some texts Leibniz acknowledges that a phenomenon can be considered 
true or real even if it lacks a foundation in some external reality, in virtue of its 
coherence with other phenomena (see, e.g., A VI, 4, 1502/L 364; DM 14; GP II, 
270/DesB 307). I follow Adams in seeing this kind of reality as weaker than 
phenomenal reality in the fullest sense, which requires an external foundation 
(Adams, Leibniz, 259-60). My point is that this more robust sort of reality does 
depend immediately on the existence and reality of the phenomenon’s 
foundation. I thank an anonymous referee for pressing me to clarify this. 
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contrary to what is often assumed, existence is not the same as being. If it 
were, there could be no such dependence of a phenomenon on its 
foundation, since a phenomenon does not depend on its foundation for its 
being. On Leibniz’s view, however, existence is more than mere being. He 
makes this clear when he claims, as he does in a number of places, that 
being is (distinctly) conceivable, whereas existence is (distinctly) perceivable 
(A VI, 1, 285/L 91; A VI, 4, 869; A VI, 4, 1499, 1500/L 363; A VI, 4, 2739; C 
437). In his thought, conceivability concerns possibility, so the contrast 
here is between the possible and the actual. We conceive the possible, but 
perceive the actual. This means that existence is something more than just 
being. A being [ens] is anything that is possible, and to have being [esse] is 
nothing other than to be possible: “Being is that the concept of which 
involves something positive or that which can be conceived by us, 
provided what we conceive is possible and involves no contradiction” (A 
VI, 4, 1500/L 363). Leibniz also equates possibility with essence [essentia]. 
So being [esse] is likewise equivalent to essence, something that is all the 
less surprising given the etymological connection between ‘essentia’ and 
‘esse’. In contrast, to exist [existere] is to be not just possible but actual, not 
just conceivable but perceivable. The difference between being and 
existence can also be seen in Leibniz’s doctrine of the striving possibles, 
which have their being in the divine understanding (T 201; GP VII, 
303-5/AG 150-52). These possibles all strive to exist, but only some succeed. 
Yet those which fail to exist still have being, namely, in the mind of God. 
Existence is therefore more than mere being.38 
Indeed, on Leibniz’s view, even beings that we humans have actually 
conceived or imagined, and which therefore have their being in our minds 
as well as the divine mind, can fail to exist. This point emerges from an 
essay on freedom and contingency in which Leibniz appeals to “those 
possibles, which neither are, nor were, nor will be” in an interesting 
(though flawed) argument against necessitarianism (A VI, 4, 1653-54/AG 
94). The argument is this: 
[I]f certain possibles never exist, then certainly existents are 
not always necessary, for otherwise it would be impossible 
for others to exist in their place, insofar as everything that 
                                                 
38. Leibniz does occasionally speak of imaginary phenomena existing in the 
mind (A VI, 4, 1500/L 363; cf. GP II, 517/DesB 371/AG 203). This sort of existence is 
equivalent to having being in the mind, but should be distinguished from the 
kind of existence which can only be ascribed to real beings (i.e., existence tout 
court). 
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never exists would be impossible. Nor indeed can we deny 
that many fables, such as those called Roman, are considered 
possible, even though they find no place in this universal 
series, which God chose, unless one imagines that in so great 
an expanse of space and time there are some poetical regions 
where King Arthur of Great Britain, Amadis of Gaul, and the 
illustrious Dietrich von Bern of the German stories can be 
seen wandering round. (ibid.) 
In this text Leibniz assigns fictional characters such as King Arthur, whom 
we have actually imagined and who thus have being in our minds, i.e., are 
beings of our imagination (or at least of our reason), to the category of 
possibles that do not exist. So the fact that they having being in our minds 
does not suffice for their existence. 
In light of all this, two points seem clear. First, things that have 
substantial being, that is, actual substances, exist. Second, imaginary 
phenomena such as King Arthur do not exist, even though they have their 
being in minds that exist. But now let us add to this the point that in 
Leibniz’s ontology, there is a third type of thing which lies between 
substances and imaginary phenomena: namely, real or well-founded 
phenomena. Like imaginary phenomena, these phenomena have their 
being in the mind: they are beings of perception or of the imagination. But 
in contrast to imaginary phenomena, well-founded phenomena do have 
some claim to existence—not, to be sure, an extramental existence, but a 
kind of existence nonetheless. On Leibniz’s view, King Arthur does not 
exist, nor does the centaur, the golden mountain, or any other fictional or 
merely possible being. But well-founded phenomena do exist. For instance, 
the rainbow that I see in the sky after a storm actually exists; unlike King 
Arthur, it is not a merely possible being. What explains this difference? It 
can only be that a well-founded phenomenon has a foundation in some 
external reality, whereas imaginary phenomena do not. Hence, from this 
point of view, a well-founded phenomenon can be said to exist, and to 
exist in virtue of having a foundation in some external reality. It therefore 
depends on this foundation for its existence. And since this dependence is 
an immediate one, this gives another sense in which a phenomenon’s 
foundational monads can be considered it immediate requisites. 
My suggestion, then, is that a phenomenon can be understood to 
depend immediately on its foundational monads for both its reality and its 
existence, even though it does not depend on those monads for its being.39 
                                                 
39. Others who distinguish being from reality in their interpretations include 
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Having posited a phenomenon, or more exactly, having posited its reality 
or existence, we must by that very fact be understood to have posited its 
foundation. As such, the monads constituting that foundation can 
plausibly be viewed as immediate requisites of the phenomenon. Given 
Leibniz’s technical definition of an aggregate of monads as a being which 
has those monads as immediate requisites, then, it follows that a 
phenomenon in the mind can be considered an aggregate of monads 
outside the mind. 
A cardinal advantage of this reading is that it furnishes a rather 
straightforward reconciliation of Leibniz’s apparently incompatible claims 
about body. By showing how monads could be immediate requisites of a 
phenomenon having its being in some other monad, it allows us to see how 
a body could be both a phenomenon and, in Leibniz’s technical sense, an 
aggregate of monads. Likewise, it allows us to see how those monads 
could be in, or be ingredients or constituents of, a phenomenon. In short, 
on this way of understanding things, Aggregation and Inclusion cohere 
perfectly with Phenomenalism. 
Against this, one might object that it is rather a stretch to suppose that a 
phenomenon’s foundational monads are its constituents or ingredients, or 
that they are in or internal to the phenomenon, given that their being is 
outside of, and not constitutive of, the being of the phenomenon. I reply as 
follows. On my reading, Leibniz considers an aggregate to be a 
phenomenon, which is in itself imaginary but can acquire a kind of reality 
in virtue of having a foundation in certain monads. As he frequently puts 
it, this aggregate, or phenomenon, “borrows” or “derives” its reality from 
those substances.40 Indeed, he says of beings by aggregation, “which are 
                                                                                                                                     
Lodge, “Aggregate,” 482-83; Kenneth L. Pearce, “Leibniz and the Veridicality of 
Body Perceptions,” Philosophers’ Imprint 16:5 (2016) 8. However, their views differ 
from mine in important respects. Lodge holds that Leibnizian aggregates have a 
“complex kind of being”, part of which is in, and dependent on the mind, and 
part of which is outside the mind, and dependent upon its constituent substances 
(p. 483; cf. pp. 472-73)—a strange kind of being! In contrast, I see the being of the 
phenomenon as wholly within, and wholly dependent on, the mind (or 
substance) to which it appears, even though it has a reality that can be said to 
derive from external substances. Pearce assimilates existence to being (p. 8), 
whereas on my view, existence (tout court) is understood as correlated with reality: 
only things which are real can be said to exist (tout court), and not all beings are 
real. For an earlier account on which reality is distinguished from unity, see Glenn 
A. Hartz, “Leibniz’s Phenomenalisms,” The Philosophical Review 101:3 (1992) 517. 
40. See, for example, A II, 2, 184/AG 85; GP VI, 516; GP II, 261-62/DeV 285-87; 
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phenomena rather than substances,” that “all their reality consists only in 
that of simple things” (GP III, 69/WF 129-30). Likewise, in the text quoted 
above from the 30 June 1704 letter to De Volder, he affirms that matter “is 
nothing but a phenomenon founded in things,” that “there is no reality in 
anything except the reality of unities,” and that “substantial unities are not 
parts, but the foundations of phenomena.” (GP II, 268/DeV 303). His view 
is therefore that aggregates, which are phenomena, have a reality that 
consists in the reality of their foundational substances. Of course, this is not 
to say that the aggregate has reality in the same way or to the same degree as 
the individual substances: it has only phenomenal reality, not substantial 
reality. Nonetheless, its reality consists in, or is constituted from, the reality 
of the substances. In a way, the reality of the substances is in the 
phenomenon. Hence, this gives us a sense in which, intuitively, these 
substances can plausibly be considered constituents of the phenomenon. 
Even though they are not constitutive of the phenomenon’s being, they, or 
rather their reality, is constitutive of the reality of the phenomenon, and 
thus, in a sense, the substances themselves can be considered constituents 
of that phenomenon.41 
                                                                                                                                     
GP II, 267/DeV 301. 
41. Here I part company with Samuel Levey, who contends that an aggregate 
can borrow reality from its constituents only if (roughly) it is nothing more than 
those constituents (Levey, “On Unity, Borrowed Reality and Multitude in 
Leibniz,” Leibniz Review 22 (2012) 104-5; cf. Rutherford, “Idealist,” 148, 160-61, 
184). I see no reason why a phenomenon could not be something more than its 
foundation—have some being over and above the being of its foundation—and 
yet have a reality that it derives from that foundation. Analogy: If the images on 
my television screen accurately depict actual events (e.g., a soccer match), then 
those images could be said to have a kind of reality in virtue of having a real 
foundation, a reality which could not be ascribed to images that depict fictional 
events. That reality would have no other source than the reality of the events 
being depicted, and thus the reality of the images could be said to be derived from 
that of the events. Yet the images would be something more than the events. 
Some commentators, perceiving an inconsistency in the idea that an aggregate 
could have its being in the mind but a reality that it derives from its substantial 
constituents, have sought to avoid this result by weakening Leibniz’s thesis of the 
convertibility of being and unity (see §2 and n. 18 above). According to Hoffman, 
Leibniz considers being and unity only extensionally equivalent: “Something has 
being if and only if it has unity, but what its being consists in might be different 
from what its unity consists in” (Hoffman, “Being,” 118). This allows him to grant 
that Leibnizian aggregates can have their unity only in the mind without having 
to admit that they have their being only in the mind. Hartz sees the convertibility 
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To this a second point may be added. In the first edition of the Critique 
of Pure Reason, Kant astutely observes that talk of things being in us or 
outside of us is subject to an unavoidable ambiguity.42 On the one hand, this 
talk may be understood physically or spatially (in his terminology: 
empirically). In this sense, to be outside of us is to be located some distance 
away from us, whereas to be in us is to be located in a region of space that 
is a (proper) part of the space we occupy. On the other hand, talk of 
internal or external objects may be understood metaphysically (in Kant’s 
terminology: transcendentally). To say that a thing is internal to us in this 
sense is just to say, not that it is spatially located within us, but rather that 
it has its being in us and through us. Such a thing is internal in the sense in 
which, for example, a modification is internal to the substance it modifies. 
To say that a thing is external to us in this sense is just to say that it does 
not have its being in or through us, that is, that it has its being in itself (e.g., 
another substance), or in some third thing that has its being in itself, as 
with the modification of another substance. Now, up to this point, when I 
have spoken of phenomena as internal to the mind or soul, or of other 
substances as external to the same, I have had the metaphysical sense in 
mind: the point was not that phenomena are spatially contained within the 
mind, or that other substances are located outside the mind in a spatial 
sense, but that phenomena have their being in and through the mind, 
whereas other substances do not. So the puzzle was not how something 
located in one place could be an aggregate of things located elsewhere; 
rather, the puzzle was how something having its being (metaphysically) in 
one substance could be an aggregate of substances that are 
(metaphysically) external to that substance. But now suppose that we shift 
from this metaphysical level of description to the physical (or spatial) level. 
Physically speaking, a phenomenon is (at least typically) located outside of 
me. For instance, the table is external in the sense that I represent it as 
being ten feet in front of me. On Leibniz’s view, however, the foundational 
                                                                                                                                     
of being and unity as restricted to substances, and thus as not applying to 
aggregates (Hartz, Final System, 217n1). However, both of these views conflict 
with the passage from NE 146 quoted above (§2), in which Leibniz argues that 
because aggregates have a mental unity, they must also have a kind of mental 
being (i.e., that of a mental content or object of perception). On the view I am 
proposing, there is no inconsistency in saying that aggregates have their unity 
and being in the mind, but a reality that they derive from their substantial 
constituents; there is thus no need for such maneuvers. 
42. See Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A372-73. 
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substances of this phenomenon are, in at least a loose or virtual sense, 
located in the same place, insofar as they each represent the world from 
their own (spatial) point of view, and thus each represent themselves as 
occupying a certain position in space.43 (In representing an object as ten 
feet in front of me, I represent myself as ten feet from that object, etc.) 
Hence, even though in the metaphysical sense a phenomenon is internal to 
the substance, whereas its foundational substances are external to that 
substance, in the physical sense those foundational substances are located 
within the phenomenon; for each of them has a location which is a proper 
part of the spatial region occupied by the phenomenon. Thus, Leibniz’s 
talk of monads as constituents of, and as internal to, a phenomenon having 
its being in another monad, is justified not only by the fact that the 
phenomenon’s reality is constituted by the reality of those monads, but 
also by the fact that, at least in a loose or virtual sense, those monads are 
spatially located within it. 
Returning now to the advantages of my view, another is that it affords a 
plausible explanation of Leibniz’s idea that phenomena result from their 
foundational monads. As we saw in the previous section, one thing can be 
said to result from others, in his terminology, just in case, having posited 
the latter things, we must immediately be understood to have posited the 
former thing as well (A VI, 4, 310). So to say that a phenomenon results 
from monads is just to say that if we posit the monads, we must thereby be 
understood to have posited the phenonenon. But how could this be? 
Rutherford suggests that if we assume the pre-established harmony, then 
                                                 
43. On the idea that monads have a kind of situation in space, see GP II, 
253/DeV 267-69; cf. GP II, 339/DesB 99; GP II, 450-51/DesB 255. In the first of these 
texts, Leibniz remarks that “even if monads are not extended, they nonetheless 
have a certain kind of situation [situs] in extension, that is, they have a certain 
ordered relation of coexistence to other things, namely, through the machine in 
which they preside.” He adds: “And I think that no finite substances exist 
separated from every body, thus neither do they lack situation or order with 
respect to other coexisting things in the universe.” These remarks suggest the 
view that a monad has situation in space in virtue of having a body. In contrast, 
the view I am ascribing to him is that a monad has situation in virtue of 
representing the universe from a certain point of view, or in other words, in virtue 
of representing itself as (or as part of) a certain body. On this view, both the 
monad’s having a body and its situation in space follow from its representational 
point of view. For helpful discussions of this issue, see Adams, Leibniz, 249-55; J. 
A. Cover and Glenn A. Hartz, “Are Leibnizian Monads Spatial?” History of 
Philosophy Quarterly 11:3 (1994) 295-316. 
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the existence of a phenomenon would be entailed by the existence of its 
foundational monads. 44  However, this entailment lacks the sort of 
immediacy Leibniz requires for resulting, since the phenomenon would 
result from the monads not by metaphysical or conceptual necessity but 
only by exigency (cf. GP II, 435/DesB 227). Another thought which might 
occur to us is that if we posit the monads which ground a certain 
phenomenon, we must thereby be understood to posit that phenomenon, 
because it belongs to the nature of those monads to perceive the entire 
universe and thus to contain that phenomenon within them. But the 
problem with this is that we must also posit in this way all the other 
phenomena those monads contain, most of which they in no way ground. 
What we need is a sense in which, having posited those monads which 
ground a certain phenomenon, we must thereby be understood to have 
posited that phenomenon (and its constituent phenomena), but no others. 
A better solution to the difficulty can be found by appealing once again 
to the distinction between being and existence. It is true that in positing the 
existence of those monads which ground a certain phenomenon, we must 
thereby be understood to have posited the being of all the phenomena 
within them. But importantly, we need not be understood to have posited 
the reality or existence of those phenomena. Indeed some of their 
phenomena will be imaginary. As for the phenomenon they ground, 
however, the situation is different. In positing the existence of these 
monads, we must posit not only that this phenomenon has its being within 
them, but also that it is real and that it exists. For we are positing not only 
the phenomenon but its foundation. We can therefore say that a 
phenomenon results from its foundational monads in the sense that, 
having posited the existence of those monads, we must immediately be 
understood to have posited the reality and existence of that phenomenon 
as well. 
This reading also affords a plausible gloss on Leibniz’s suggestion that 
bodies are not simply mental but “semi-mental” (GP II, 304, 306/DesB 31, 
35; cf. GP II, 504, 506/DesB 351, 356). In his recent paper on Leibniz’s 
idealism, Rutherford claims that “If an aggregate were merely a thought or 
perceived thing, then it would be wholly mental, not semi-mental.”45 From 
the perspective of my reading, however, this is not the case. As I have said, 
a phenomenon can be understood to derive its reality from its foundational 
monads. In the same way, it can be understood to derive its existence from 
                                                 
44. Rutherford, “Idealist,” 181-83. 
45. Rutherford, “Idealist,” 176. 
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those monads: if the monads ceased to exist, so would the phenomenon. 
Hence, even though, as a phenomenon, a body’s being and unity would 
reside only in the perceiver, thus rendering the body in itself mental, it 
would have an existence and reality that are more than merely mental in 
virtue of being grounded in and derived from an external foundation. This 
may well be the sense in which Leibniz considers bodies to be semi-mental. 
Finally, I can now clarify how this proposal differs from the views of 
others who have stressed the importance of Leibniz’s technical definitions. 
Of particular significance are the views of Rutherford and Arthur. A 
central point on which the three of us agree is that when Leibniz affirms 
Aggregation and Inclusion, his point is simply that a body has monads as 
its immediate requisites. However, neither Rutherford nor Arthur see how 
something having its being only in the mind could have monads as its 
immediate requisites. From Rutherford’s perspective, if an aggregate were 
a phenomenon in the sense of an appearance or mental content, then it 
would be “a mere idea or image” and as such would lack the sort of reality 
bodies are supposed to possess.46 Similarly, Arthur rejects the conception 
of bodies as “phenomena in the sense of mental phenomena of perceivers” 
on the ground that, so conceived, bodies could not be understood to 
presuppose monads in the way a thing presupposes its immediate 
requisites. 47  For both Rutherford and Arthur, then, an aggregate of 
monads must be something other than a phenomenon in the mind, and 
thus must be a phenomenon, if at all, in some attenuated sense. In contrast, 
my view purports to explain how even a phenomenon in what Rutherford 
calls the “narrower and more usual” sense can be understood as an 
aggregate of monads. 
 
5. Conclusion 
I have argued that in his discussions of the relationship between the bodies 
of everyday experience and the fundamental constituents of the created 
world, Leibniz uses terms such as ‘ingredient’, ‘constituent’, and 
‘aggregate’ in technical senses which allow for the surprising result that 
something having its being only in the mind can be an aggregate of things 
outside the mind, and the equally surprising result that the latter things 
can be considered constituents of the former. If this is correct, then the 
result is a remarkable one. In one fell swoop it renders perfectly intelligible 
a large number of passages that commentators have traditionally found 
                                                 
46. Rutherford, “Idealist,” 177. 
47. Arthur, “Presupposition,” 103. 
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rather puzzling and that have led some to posit ambiguities and others to 
attempt explanations of why Leibniz would repeatedly and sometimes 
simultaneously advance conflicting theories of the nature of body. From 
the point of view I have been defending here, most if not all of these 
passages make perfect sense. When, for instance, Leibniz says in a single 
paragraph that bodies are assemblages of monads, but also that they are 
only well-founded phenomena that are “different in different observers” 
and “like exact and enduring dreams”, and that material things are 
“nothing outside perceptions” (GP III, 622-23), he detects no tension 
because on his understanding of what it means to be an assemblage, that is, 
an aggregate, something having its being in one monad can be an 
assemblage of other monads. In his idiolect, an aggregate is simply a thing 
that depends immediately on multiple other things, its immediate 
requisites, for its being, existence, or reality. As a being of perception or of 
the imagination, a phenomenon in one monad admittedly does not depend 
on other monads in this way for its being. However, it can be supposed to 
depend on other monads in this way for its reality and existence, since 
without a foundation in some external reality, a phenomenon cannot be 
considered real, and thus cannot be said to exist. In positing the reality and 
existence of a phenomenon, we must by that very fact be understood to 
have posited the reality and existence of its foundation. Hence, a 
phenomenon that is “nothing outside perceptions” can, in a sense, be an 
aggregate of monads having their being outside of perception. In short, 
Aggregation and Inclusion cohere perfectly with Phenomenalism, just as 
Leibniz seems to think.48 
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